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SELF-CENSORSHIP AND THE CONSTRICTION OF
THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION UNDER MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES
R. GEORGE WRIGHT*
INTRODUCTION
Censorship can take many forms. The nature of the censor;
the justifications for censorship; the identities of the targeted
parties; the forms and stages of thought and communication
being censored; the topics or viewpoints subject to censorship;
the means of censorship, pre- and post-speech; and the costs
threatened or imposed on the censored parties and the broader
society may all vary.'
A primary concern of the Enlightenment writers was the
central case of prior licensing or legal punishment imposed by
the government through formal, official processes. This general
form of censorship draws the attention of such luminaries as
John Milton,2 Benedict Spinoza,' John Locke,' Lord Shaftes-
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law-Indianapolis.
1. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION (1970);
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
2. SeeJOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 6 (John W. Hales ed., 1917) (1644)
("We should be wary ... what persecution we raise against the living labours of
publick men, how we spill that season'd life of man preserv'd and stor'd up in
Books; since we see a kinde of homicide may thus be committed, sometimes a
martyrdome, and if it extend to the whole impression, a kinde of massacre,
whereof the execution ends not in the slaying of an elementall life, but strikes
at that ethereall and fift essence, the breath of reason it selfe, slaies an immor-
tality rather then a life.").
3. See I BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, Theologico-Political Treatise, in THE CHIEF
WORKS OF BENEDICT DE SPINOzA 1, 257 (R.H.M. Elwes trans., 1951) (1670)
("[G]overnment which attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical, and
it is considered an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of sub-
jects, to seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true, or rejected as false
4. SeeJOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 19 (John Horton
& Susan Mendus eds., 1991) (1689) ("I affirm, that the magistrate's power
extends not to the establishing of any articles of faith, or forms of worship, by
the force of his laws.").
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bury,5 David Hume,6 Voltaire,' Thomas Jefferson,' Condorcet,9
Thomas Paine, " James Madison," and Joseph Story.' 2
Official governmental censorship, however, does not
exhaust the different forms of censorship. Non-governmental
groups of various sizes, ranging from one's own social circle, to a
private organization, to one's small-town neighbors, to broader
5. See 1 ANTHONY EARL OF SHAFTESBURY, A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm, in
CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN, MANNERS, OPINIONS, TIMES, ETC. 5, 9-10 (John M.
Robertson ed., 1900) (1708) ("But who shall be judge of what may be freely
examined and what may not? .. . If men are vicious, petulant, or abusive, the
magistrate may correct them: but if they reason ill, 'tis reason still must teach
them to do better.").
6. See DAVID HUME, Of the Liberty of the Press, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL,
AND LITERARY 9, 9 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Fund rev. ed. 1985) (1742)
("Nothing is more apt to surprize a foreigner, than the extreme liberty, which
we enjoy in this country, of communicating whatever we please to the public,
and of openly censuring every measure, entered into by the king or his
ministers.").
7. See VOLTAIRE, Liberty of the Press, in PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY (1750),
reprinted in THE PORTABIL ENLIGHTENMENT READER 416, 421-24 (Isaac Kramnick
ed., Penguin Books 1995) (discussing the limited effect of heterodox books on
the broad public well-being, and the availability of non-legal responses).
8. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in WRIT-
INGs 346, 347 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., The Library of America 1984) (1777,
1779) ("[I]t is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its
officers to interfere when the principles break out into overt acts against peace
and good order; ... errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely
to contradict them.").
9. See MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION IN EUROPE (1786), reprinted in CONDORCET SELECTED WRITINGS 71,
79 (Keith M. Baker ed., 1976) ("We have seen [the American] respectfully obey-
ing those entrusted with the public power, without renouncing the right to seek
to enlighten them and to denounce to the nation their faults or their errors.").
10. See THOMAS PAINE, The Rights of Man, in REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS
133 (Harry Hayden Clark ed., American Century rev. ed. 1961) (1791-92) (gen-
erally citing favorably the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen,
including XI on the responsible "communication of thoughts and opinions" as
"one of the most precious rights of man").
11. SeeJAMES MADISON, Report On the Alien and Sedition Acts, in WRITINGS
608, 651 (Jack N. Rakove ed., The Library of America ed. 1999) (1800)
(describing the Sedition Act as "leveled against that right of freely examining
public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people
thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every
other right").
12. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 704 (1833) (stating that the free speech clause "imports no
more, than that every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opin-
ions upon any subject whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so always, that he
does not injure any other person in his rights, person, property, or reputation;
and so always, that he does not thereby disturb the public peace, or attempt to
subvert the government").
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groupings including an entire society, can all exercise informal
but effective forms of censorship.
Of those who have emphasized the varieties of social, as dis-
tinct from governmental, censorship, John Stuart Mill is perhaps
the most influential. Mill expressly distinguishes society from polit-
icalfunctionaies." Mill speaks of "a social tyranny more formida-
ble than many kinds of political oppression."" While social
tyranny cannot normally exact severe penalties,' "it leaves fewer
means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details
of life, and enslaving the soul itself."" Thus, Mill describes the
need for "protection . . . against the tyranny of the prevailing
opinion and feeling."' 7
There may be a sense in which law and government are still
lurking in the background even in such cases,"s but certainly a
rough distinction remains between governmental repression and
more "privatized" sorts of repression. Even if we set aside official
government censorship, however, the range of the remaining
forms of censorship is still surprisingly broad.
Our focus herein is on some forms of what may be classified
as a third general form of censorship-self-censorship-and in
particular on forms of what we call "input-side self-censorship,"
with an at least superficially voluntary quality. Of course, even
the most apparently voluntary self-censorship occurs in a social
context, and has important social elements and dimensions. But
we will be considering cases that can reasonably be categorized as
involving self-censorship rather than overt social group oppres-
sion that overbears the will of the potential dissenter.'
13. See JOHN STUART MIu, ON LIu.RTY 63 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.,
1974) (1859).
14. Id.
15. See id. We should not, however, overlook cases in which an oppressive
group or culture has, through ostracism or evident disapproval and contempt,
driven persons to depression or suicide.
16. Id. Arguably, a social tyranny that comes to enslave the soul itself is
worse, along the dimension of severity, than an official, formal imprisonment
that involves no further attempt to shape and control the prisoner's thoughts or
words.
17. Id. Of course a locally dominant and even realistically inescapable
social tyranny may be at odds with the opinion prevailing at a broader and more
general social level; a "cult" could presumably operate in just such an
environment.
18. Reciprocally, of course, many cases of official government repression
may ultimately depend upon popular or private group sentiment.
19. For representative treatments of the still importantly unclear and con-
tested idea of coercion, see, for example, COERCION (J. Roland Pennock &John
W. Chapman eds., 2007); ROBERT NOZICK, SOCRATIC PuzzLEs 15-44 (1997);
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This Essay will focus on the impact of self-censorship on our
modern society and why this should be a disturbing phenome-
non. The Essay will also suggest a way to move away from the
current trajectory towards increasing self-censorship. Part I of
this Essay will begin by focusing on some of the legal scholars and
political philosophers who have discussed self-censorship and
how it harms society. Next, the Essay will turn to the implications
of our modern world, with a special emphasis on the Internet.
Part II will focus on how changing our cultural emphasis to
embrace the pursuit of truth can help stem the tide of our ever-
increasing self-censorship. Finally, the Essay will conclude by
tying the ideas of self-censorship and the pursuit of truth into
our countries' current problems with political partisanship.
I. SELF-CENSORSHIP AND ITS CONTEMPORARY FORM
A. The Choice to Self-Censor
The well-known theorizing and experimentation of Profes-
sor Cass Sunstein provides an entry into the problem of arguably
voluntary self-censorship.20 Of course, there are many forms of
broadly political self-censorship. And issues of political self-cen-
sorship in general are hardly new.21 But Professor Sunstein's
concerns are distinctive and, to a degree, focus on the effects of
contemporary communications technology.
Professor Sunstein does not himself generally use the term
self-censorship. And the problems he discusses stem, at least par-
tially, from genuine information consumption choices facilitated
by technological advances. We can thus hardly deny that the
kinds of self-censorship in which we are interested reflect individ-
ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987);Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and
Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79 (1981).
20. See, e.g., CASS R. SuNSTEIN, GOING To EXTREMES: How LIKE MINDS
UNITE AND DIVIE (2009) [hereinafter GOING To EXTREMES]; Cass R. Sunstein,
The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. Pot. PHIL. 175 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YAi.E L.J. 71 (2000); Cass Sun-
stein, The Daily We, Bos. REVIEW (Summer 2001), http://www.bostonreview.
net/BR26.3/sunstein.php. See also Andrew Kalloch, Sunstein: Lack of Ideological
Diversity Leads to Extremism, HARV. LAW RECORD (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.hi
record.org/2.4463/sunstein-lack-of-ideological-diversity-leads-to-extremism-1.
577488.
21. Consider the alternative rhetorical strategies, involving less candor
and less public educational value, available to Socrates at his trial. See PLATO,
THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES: EUTHNHRo, APOLOGY, CRITO, PHAEDO (Hugh
Tredennick & Harold Tarrant trans., Penguin Books ed. 1993) (399 B.C.). For
self-censorship that apparently backfired, see Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,
213 (1919) (supposedly prudent verbal self-restraint, if explicitly referred to, as
intimating that a stronger message may be inferred by an audience).
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ual choices among alternatives, and in that sense, reflect per-
sonal freedom. But on Professor Sunstein's analysis, things are a
bit more complicated and equivocal.
Professor Sunstein posits a process of fragmentation, polari-
zation, and "cyberbalkanization"22 via social processes that may
take on a partly unrecognized and generally unintended life of
their own. Sunstein crucially argues that more than with prior
communications technologies, "[t]he Internet is making it possi-
ble for people to design a kind of Daily Me-their personal com-
munications packages, which include only the topics and
opinions that they like and exclude troublesome issues and disfa-
vored voices."23
This may, in a sense, be seen as an enhancement of individ-
ual freedom. But the potential for negative as well as positive
effects, intended as well as unintended, on freedom seems clear.
Self-selection can, for example, lead to something like self-segre-
gation at the level of partisan affiliation or ideology. Worse still,
Sunstein suggests, based on his own empirical research and that
of others, that some of the most disturbing unintended dynamics
of deliberation and discussion occur mainly among the mostly
like-minded. In particular, "[iif people on the Internet are delib-
erating mostly with like-minded others, their views will not
merely be reinforced; they will instead be shifted to more
"124
extreme points.
The term polarization is ambiguous; Professor Sunstein is
thus positing a process, affecting largely homogeneous political
groupings, of what might awkwardly be called "extremification"
of preexisting political perspectives.2 ' The term "echo chamber"
is thus misleadingly benign. We do not merely echo our selected
colleagues. To the extent that many of us begin to communicate
22. See SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES, supra note 20, at 79.
23. Id. at 79-80.
24. Id. at 81.
25. See id. at 20, 89. Particularly within an already ideologically distinctive,
if not homogeneous, grouping, after deliberating with one another, people are
likely to move toward a more extreme point in the direction to which they were
previously inclined, as indicated by the median of their predeliberation judg-
ments. Sunstein, The Daily We, supra note 20. One possible reason for this might
be that the unusual validation of one's articulated views may seem to lower the
costs and risks of expressing a more extreme-and in some ways, more self-
indulgent-view. Speculatively, we might imagine that "extremification" could
contribute to an increase not only in useful "watchdog" behavior, but in what
neutral observers would view as corruption. We might also speculate that
increased "extremification" could encourage political "attack ads." See STEPHEN
ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IVENGAR, GoING NEGATIVE: How Po-rricAL ADVERTISE-
MENTS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1996).
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mainly in ways that reinforce, intensify, and "extremify" our
views, we engage in varying degrees in a form of "input" self-
censorship.
Our concern is not with whether this general process of
political self-segregation, mutual reinforcement, and "extremifi-
cation" is more prominent today, with contemporary technolo-
gies, than at any previous point in our history." Nor is our
concern with the undoubtedly few, if any, persons who experi-
ence only pure ideological homogeneity." Neither do we
assume that the process Professor Sunstein describes can never
in any respect contribute favorably to the quality of public discus-
sion and debate.28
In fact, for our purposes, we need not even assume that what
we refer to as input-side "self-censorship" has been established in
any strong, pervasive form by clear and incontestable scientific
evidence." It suffices for our purposes if there is enough evi-
dence of self-censorship processes to raise legitimate concerns
regarding the promotion of the long-term public interest.
From our perspective, it is important to remember that self-
censorship can take on a variety of forms. Our main concern is
not that consumers of news and opinion are not freely choosing
from available media outlets. Nor is our main concern that per-
26. It would be difficult to compare today's technology to a time of three
major television network nightly newscasts, competing largely for a similar audi-
ence, as well as a time in which major cities may have supported a number of
highly partisan daily newspapers.
27. Certainly the bulk of the theory and evidence discussed below, see
infra notes 61-69 and accompanying text, involve some diversity of perspective
for most news and opinion consumers.
28. Newly formed, stigmatized, privacy-emphasizing, or otherwise vulner-
able groups, may at least for a time benefit from an unusually isolated, protec-
tive, or incubational environment. Such groups may otherwise, at the very least,
find themselves devoting too much time and energy to repeated, basic-level
arguments and group-defense, at the expense of further elaborating and devel-
oping their program, with certain basic premises taken largely for granted
within the group. Of course, such groups should also be sensitive, perhaps espe-
cially so, to their broader political and cultural environment. But this broader
environmental sensitivity can presumably be maintained at the group's own ini-
tiative. And in some contexts, even a group that we think has become implausi-
bly extremist can perform "gadfly"-type public service. Further, groups with a
charitable or public service focus may actually draw useful motivation from
their artificial extremism, lack of perspective, "tunnel vision," or obsessiveness.
29. See the sampling of some of the relevant evidence infra at notes
41-69 and accompanying text. See also, at least suggestively, the language of
James Davison Hunter, Polarization and the Crisis ofLegitimacy, 12 THE HEDGEHOG
REV. 62 (Fall 2010); Group Polarization: The Trend to Extreme Decisions, PsvBlioc
(Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.spring.org.uk/2009/09/group-polarization-the-
trend-to-extreme-decisions.php (last visited Jan. 7, 2011).
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sons are not genuinely free-at least initially-in what they
choose to say, as their speech "output," before any unintended
and unrecognized group dynamics change what the members of
homogeneous groups may want to say.
Our main concern is instead really with persons' construct-
ing, perhaps partly unintentionally, various sorts of barriers, obvi-
ous and subtle, to their recognizing or taking genuinely seriously
the best arguments against whatever political opinions they even-
tually adopt. To the extent that persons somehow participate in
screening out, distorting, oversimplifying, trivializing, depreciat-
ing, dismissing, or remaining ignorant of the apparently best
arguments against their own perspectives, they are engaging in a
process of input-side self-censorship.
What is distinctive about this form of self-censorship is the at
least partly voluntary and systematic constriction and distortion
of the flow of potentially vital inputs into one's thinking or speak-
ing. This is not a matter of refusing to express or articulate one's
fully formulated beliefs. The main concern is thus not with self-
imposed gag orders, but with self-censorship as systematically
refusing to access or seriously engage potentially crucial inputs
into the formulation and testing of one's thoughts and speech.
Of course, time and attention for such matters are scarce
resources for everyone. One cannot read everything of impor-
tance. Neutrality of choice in this context is generally an illusion.
But not everyone's processes of news and opinion gathering, and
of belief formation, are thus systematically skewed in an equal
fashion.3 0
Professor Sunstein's work, as well as the related work of
others,' has drawn significant media attention and provoked
ongoing discussion." Even the most tentative assessment of any
30. Equally clearly, we can recognize a systematically impoverished and
distorted process of information gathering without presuming to recognize a
"neutrally" or properly formed political opinion, or being able to say in great
detail what a supposedly "neutral" or otherwise supposedly undistorted diet of
news and opinion would consist of for any given reason. Certainly what counts
as a minimally adequate diet will depend to a degree on a person's pre-existing
time-availability, commitments, capacities, interests, circumstances, and iden-
tity, even if these are revisable over time.
31. See, e.g., FARHAD MANOO, TRUE ENOUGH: LEARNING To LIVE IN A POST-
FAcr SociETY 173-74 (2008) ("[F]ragmentation in the media has allowed . . .
aggrieved viewers to seek out news that is more to their liking and has conse-
quently made a fortune for organizations ... that purposefully slant news toward
certain partisan groups.") (emphasis in the original). See also id. at 175-77 &
175 n.*.
32. See, e.g., Tejinder Singh, The Case for Viral Citizenship, 4 HARv. L.
& PoL'v REV. (ONUNE) (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.hlpronline.com/2010/01/
129
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possible link between modern communications technology and
input self-censorship must be multifaceted. We must certainly
take some account, for example, of the related work on declining
social capital by Robert Putnam, and of Bill Bishop on our
increasingly homogeneous neighborhoods.3 4
Or consider the continuing relevance of a classic argument
of John Stuart Mill. Mill famously asserts:
He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of
that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been
able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute
the reasons on the opposite side, if he does not so much as
know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either
opinion.3 5
Perhaps even more relevantly for our purposes, Mill empha-
sizes that we must hear more than our allies' versions of our
opponents' arguments, perhaps prepackaged with refutations.
That amounts to something like mere shadowboxing. Instead,
we must hear opposing positions as formulated and expressed by
singh (explaining that citizens are increasingly behaving like consumers, in the
sense of seeking out favorable evidence, and ignoring or dismissing unfavorable
evidence bearing upon their pre-existing preferences, in an increasingly empty,
gladiatorial, vitriolic public policy and electoral debate); Thomas S. Ulen,
Democracy on the Line: A Review of Republic.com by Cass Sunstein, 2001 U. Iu.. J.L.
TECH. & PoL'Y 317, 337-38 (arguing from Putnam's work that the decline in
our "social capital," connectedness, and mutual engagement predates any possi-
ble influence of computer-accessed news and opinion-"Voting, giving, trust-
ing, meeting, visiting, and so on had all begun to decline while Bill Gates was
still in grade school."); David Brooks, Riders on the Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2010, at A21 (discussing Sunstein's basic argument and some empirical evi-
dence presenting critiques and limitations thereof); Nicholas D. Kristof, The
Daily Me, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19, 2009, at A31 (citing a number of relevant works,
along with that of Professor Sunstein, including BILL BiSHOP, THE Bc SORT:
WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING Us APART (2008) (on
historically increasing tendencies toward geographic segregation by political
beliefs and other criteria, resulting in increasing localized political homogene-
ity)); Christopher Caldwell, How On Earth Do You Tame Extremists? Cass Sunstein
Tackles an Impossible Task, SLATE (June 15, 2009), http://www.slate.com/id/221
9486 (discussing the possibility of different forms of deliberation having either
positive or negative effects on democracy); James A. Thomson, A House Divided:
Polarization and Partisanship, PLAIN DEALER ONLINE (Cleveland) (May 14, 2010),
http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2010/05/a-housedivided_
polarization.a.html ("Countries at war seek to dehumanize the enemy, to
underscore its supposed moral defects, in order to motivate the troops. In
politics, the same applies.").
33. See Ulen, supra note 32, at 338 (discussing Putnam).
34. See Kristof, supra note 32 (discussing Bishop's "Big Sort"
phenomenon).
35. MILL., supra note 13, at 98.
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those "who actually believe them, who defend them in earnest
and do their very utmost for them."" We must hear opposing
arguments from those able and motivated to formulate them "in
their most plausible and persuasive form."" And even before
self-segregation through modern communications technologies,
Mill argues that the overwhelming majority of educated persons
"have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those
who think differently from them.""
Overall, Mill seems not only to have recognized the censor-
ship potential of informal, non-governmental groups, as we saw
above,39 but to have anticipated some elements40 of the contem-
porary Sunstein-type concerns as well. To this we could easily
add the work of any number of contemporary social scientists
and other writers.
James Surowiecki, for example, emphasizes the importance
of diverse perspectives and independence of individual thought
and experience in some kinds of group decisionmaking.41
Surowiecki argues that "groups that are too much alike find it
harder to keep learning, because each member is bringing less
and less new information to the table. Homogenous groups ...
become progressively less able to investigate alternatives."42
Surowiecki argues that such a group's increasing errors tend
to be unidirectional, cumulative, and systematic, rather than ran-
dom and uncorrelated, and therefore often more damaging." As
a group excludes or rationalizes away challenging perspectives,
its members increasingly reinforce rather than adapt their
36. Id. at 99.
37. Id.
38. Id. Mill's overall implication, though, seems to be that political par-
tisans who enjoy self-validation and self-confirmation might actually benefit by
attempting to construct the strongest possible cases against their own views, but
that any such attempt would be far inferior to an authentic encounter with the
best articulations of sincere opponents. See id. at 98-99. See also Balanced Argu-
ments are More Persuasive, PsvBiOG (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.spring.org.uk/
2010/11/balanced-arguments-are-more-persuasive.php (last visited Jan. 7,
2011).
39. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
40. I cannot personally recall Mill, in any of his writings, clearly making
the claim that deliberations within mostly homogeneous groups tend to drive
the group further toward a more extreme position. For the view that homoge-
neity leads to "extremification," see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
41. SeeJAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CRowns xix-xx (2005).
42. Id. at 31. Any such inadvertent serious and systematic impairment of
one's own information-gathering and information-processing would fall within
what we have referred to as input-side self-censorship.
43. See id. at 41.
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beliefs." The homogeneous group thus becomes vulnerable to
"groupthink"" and to dogmatism or closed-mindedness.4 6
Meaningful group self-correction may eventually become almost
impossible.
Relatedly, social scientist Philip Tetlock4 7 suggests that "[w]e
need to cultivate the art of self-overhearing. . . . If we listen to
ourselves carefully, we will often not like what we hear."" Profes-
sor Tetlock's studies recognize the possible danger of the "vice of
excessive open-mindedness,""9 but conclude that the generally
greater danger in judging and forecasting is "hubris, the . . . vice
of closed-mindedness, of dismissing dissonant possibilities too
quickly."" Specifically, Professor Tetlock refers to "the ridicu-
lously low thresholds of proof that partisans set for rustling up
evidence that supports their side or casts aspersions on the
other."5 '
There is also a related social science literature on what has
been called "confirmation bias." The general idea of confirma-
tion bias is hardly new, dating at the very least from the time of
Francis Bacon.5 ' Bacon observed:
The human understanding, once it has adopted opin-
ions . . . draws everything else to support and agree with
them. And though it may meet a greater number and
weight of contrary instances, it will, with great and harmful
prejudice, ignore or condemn or exclude them . . . in
order that the authority of those earlier assumptions may
remain intact and unharmed.
Of course, input self-censorship can also take the additional
form of, in various ways, ensuring that one rarely encounters
44. See id. at 37.
45. See id. at 36-37 (discussing the political-psychological classic IRVING L.
JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS
(2d ed. 1982)).
46. See id. at 37-38. See generally, T. W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITA-
RIAN PERSONALIrY (1950) (empirical study on the rise of the "authoritarian type
of man" and the concomitant rise of fascism); MILTON RoKEACH, THE OPEN AND
C[.OSED MIND: INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE NATURE OF BELIEF SYSTEMS AND PERSON-
ALITY SYSTEMS (1960).
47. PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POuTICAL JUDGMENT: How Goon IS IT?
How CAN WE KNow? (2005).
48. Id. at 215.
49. Id. at 23.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 215.
52. FRANCIS BACON, NovUM ORGANUM (Peter Urbach & John Gibson ed.
& trans., Open Court 1994) (1620).
53. Id. at Book I. Aphorisms 46, at 57.
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views contrary to one's own convictions, at least as cogently
expressed by the best opposing advocates." As we shall see,
opposing views can be approached in a wide variety of materially
different spirits."
The contemporary literature on confirmation bias is now siz-
able," with the Baconian formula undergoing some clarification,
if not modification. One contemporary reviewer of the literature
has concluded:
[Confirmation bias] refers usually to unwitting selectivity
in the acquisition and use of evidence. The line between
deliberate selectivity in the use of evidence and unwitting
molding of facts to fit hypotheses or beliefs is a difficult
one to draw in practice, but the distinction is meaningful
conceptually, and confirmation bias has more to do with
the latter than with the former.5 7
More broadly, there is a continuum of self-censorship from
the most self-conscious and deliberate sorts, to the most "unwit-
ting" and consciously unrecognized sorts. Researchers have
found that participants in social science studies have, from one
point on the continuum or another, "distorted new information
to favor their preferred alternative."5 8 Neither is this just an indi-
vidual phenomenon-"groups [also] displayed a confirmation
bias; groups requested more information that supported the ini-
tial group opinion than information contrary to the group
opinion."5
54. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
56. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phe-
nomenon in Many Guises, 2 Riv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).
57. Id. at 175. Much more narrowly, under the concept of confirmation
bias one could imagine that "hypothesis testers are unlikely to seek information
expected to be inconsistent with the target hypothesis, even if that information
is quite diagnostic." Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the
Irrelevant: Anchors in judgment of Belief and Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 120, 133 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds.,
2002) [hereinafter HEURISTICS].
58. Lyn M. Van Swol, Perceived Importance of Information: The Effects of Men-
tioning Information, Shared Information Bias, Ownership Bias, and Confirmation Bias,
10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 239, 242 (2007). Relatedly, "[p]eople
rated confirming information as more convincing and were more critical of
disconfirming information." Id. See also David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L.
Cohen, Accepting Threatening Information: Self-Affirmation and the Reduction of
Defensive Biases, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Scz. 119, 119-20 (2002)
(describing reader beliefs as biasing their interpretation of new information,
and further confirming those beliefs).
59. See Swol, supra note 58. Stable, if unfortunate, equilibria can be the
result of reasoning and social processes that may seem justifiable. See, e.g., Wing
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Beyond this general social science work, a number of studies
have focused more particularly on the dynamics of contemporary
news and opinion dissemination, and on the Internet in particu-
lar, with more directly specific relevance to the Sunstein thesiso
and to our concern for input self-censorship. This additional
analysis, while occasionally being optimistic, has raised serious
concerns about the type of self-censorship now freely available to
all. This Essay will next contemplate those studies and their
ramifications.
B. The Impact of Modern Media &f Technology
With the advent of modern technology, most specifically the
Internet, the ability to self-censor has increased. Many recent
studies have concentrated on how this technology has influenced
the types of ideas and arguments to which people are exposed.
The more optimistic studies conclude, for example, that the
Internet "is a 'mixed blessing' for deliberation, as it generates
both unintentional exposure to opposing views, as well as 'driv-
ers' that channel users away from opposing views.""' Even so,
there seems to be evidence that "[i]n many online settings, indi-
viduals effectively choose to deliberate only with similarly-inter-
ested or likely-positioned others; in such settings there is not only
Suen, Mutual Admiration Clubs, 48 ECON. INQUIRY 123 (2010) (describing the
tendency to consider people with similar beliefs well-informed and associate
more with them, as then leading to like-minded groups each believing in their
own insightfulness); Matthew Gentzkow &Jesse M. Shapiro, Media Bias and Rep-
utation, 114J. POL. ECON. 280 (2006) (describing the model in which news prov-
iders bias their presentations toward customer beliefs in order to build a
reputation for quality among those customers). Note as well the social costs of
a tendency to believe that one's own opinions, validated by more or less homo-
geneous peers, are more widely shared than they actually are. See Emily Pronin
et al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological Perspectives, in HEURIS-
TICS, supra note 57, at 636, 642. There are also the social costs of what is called
"'motivated reasoning" about politics, in which the focus is not on a disinter-
ested pursuit of the truth, wherever it may lie, but on some form of psychologi-
cal or social gratification based on one's established opinions. See, e.g., DREW
WESTEN, THE POuTIcA BRAIN: THE RotE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF
THE NATION (2007); Philip E. Tetlock, Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prose-
cutors: Exploring the Empirical Implications of Deviant Functionalist Metaphors, in
HEURISlsS, supra note 57, at 582, 583 (referring to the desire not to be right in
some objective sense, or even as judged by a broader culture, but to "protect
and enhance" one's social identity "in the eyes of the constituencies" toward
which one feels the most accountability).
60. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
61. Azi Lev-On & Bernard Manin, Happy Accidents: Deliberation and Online
Exposure to Opposing Views, EUROZINE (July 19, 2006), http://www.eurozine.com/
articles/2006-07-19-manin-en.html.
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a reduced diversity of views, but also limited opportunities to
encounter opposing views. "62
Specifying, and then quantifying, these phenomena pose
problems. But there is certainly some reasonable grounds for
overall public interest concern. One study, for example, found
that "[a]bout 94% of political blog readers consume only blogs
from one side of the ideological spectrum. The remaining 6%
read blogs from both sides . . . . Few who read political blogs
habitually seek out blogs from the other side of the ideological
spectrum."" At first blush, these sorts of numbers suggest a dis-
turbing willful intellectual and political isolationism, whatever
further social effects may occur.
The picture is complicated by phenomena such as blog-to-
blog linking, which can cross partisan and ideological lines.6 4
Most blog-to-blog links, however-91% in one study-do not
seem to cross political lines." Of the blog-to-blog links that do
cross political lines, many do so in a spirit falling far short of a
joint enterprise in dispassionately seeking the truth. 6 The
"spirit" with which one blog links to a generally politically
opposed political blog can range across a broad continuum. The
spirit or tone of the link may be one of crediting a point well
made, to a variety of more neutral states of mind, to condescen-
sion, derision, dismissiveness, basic incomprehension, astonish-
ment, or contempt.
62. Bernard Manin, Professor, N.Y. Univ. & Azi Lev-On, Professor, N.Y.
Univ., Address at the Second Conference on Online Deliberation: Online
Deliberation and Exposure to Opposing Views (May 20, 2005), available at
http://www.online-deliberation.net/conf2005/viewabstract.php?id=24.
63. Henry Farrell, Eric Lawrence & John Sides, Self-Segregation or Delibera-
tion? Blog Readership, Participation and Polarization in American Politics, 8 PERSP. ON
Pot. 141 (2010).
64. See, e.g., Eszter Hargittai et al., Cross-Ideological Discussions Among Con-
servative and Liberal Bloggers, 134 Pun. CHOICE 67 (2008).
65. Id. at 76. For a definition of the blog phenomenon of "trolling," see
the noun form "troll," UrbanDictionary, http://www.urbandictionary.com/
define.php?term=troll (last visitedJan. 10, 2011) ("One who posts a deliberately
provocative message to a newsgroup or message board with the intention of
causing maximum disruption and argument."). For the broadly "disinhibiting
effect" of Internet communications, see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F.
Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1537, 1575 (2007);John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOL. &
BEHAV. 321 (2004).
66. The most common form of such linkage has been found to be of the
so-called "straw-man" variety. Hargittai, supra note 64, at 84. There are also
occasional blogs that may proclaim: We read [a politically opposed blog] so you
don't have to.
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The frequency of cross-ideological blog linkage, quantita-
tively, may also tell us little about whether anyone who clicks on
the link is genuinely open to influence. Certainly, a favorite and
predictable blog routinely presenting mind-cocoa for its devotees
may offer no links at all, or links only to predictably safe, reassur-
ing, unchallenging blogs. Similar blogs may also offer links to
pre-refuted opposing views, intended mainly to re-confirm the
standard perspective of the "gateway" blog. Many of those who
do click on such a link may do so only in the corresponding
spirit. In the extreme case, some may even post troll-type com-
ments that tend to degrade the quality of the opposing site, and
invite similarly degrading retaliation. The overall result may be
that both sites become less appealing to anyone interested in an
efficient search for truth, let alone civil discourse.
It is in this context that we must place the studies that have
found reassuringly low and stable degrees of ideological self-seg-
regation, and the common use of multiple news sources, on the
Internet.17 Unfortunately, it is not easy to answer the really cru-
cial questions in this area. We might want to know at a minimum
the typical length of stay at a politically uncongenial newspaper's
website. But even then, the meaning of a long stay might not be
clear. It is possible that some conservatives might spend an hour
on the New York Times website working on the Sunday Cross-
word Puzzle. It is also possible that some political liberals might
spend substantial time on relatively conservative New York news-
paper websites for their sports sections.
Visiting a politically uncongenial website merely to keep
track of what one's political opponents are saying, in an only
minimally closed-minded" fashion, should not count as self-cen-
sorship for our purposes. But at some point visiting an opposing
news or opinion site with a sufficiently dismissive attitude or even
67. See the widely cited work of Gentzkow and Shapiro, especially Mat-
thew Gentzkow &Jesse M. Shapiro, Ideological Segregation Online and Offline (Chi-
cago Booth Sch. of Bus. Working Paper No. 10-19, Initiative on Global Markets
Working Paper No. 55, 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1588
920.
68. See supra note 46. For additional contemporary work on dogmatism
or closed-mindedness and political ideology, see, for example, John T. Jost et
al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PsyCHOI.. Buu_. 339
(2003); Silvia Knobloch-Westerwick &Jingbo Meng, Looking the Other Way: Selec-
tive Exposure to Attitude-Consistent and Counterattitudinal Political Information, 36
COMm. Rks. 426 (2009) (finding rather substantial voluntary exposure to
counterattitudinal media messages, but in an artificial experimental context).
See asoJonathan Haidt, What Makes People Vote Republican?. EDGE (Sept. 9, 2008),
http://www.edge.org/3rd-culture/haidt08/haidt08-index.html (referring to
the "partisan mindset" of "reject first, ask rhetorical questions later").
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a fundamental ignorance and hostility amounts to self-censorship
if one's preconceptions are typically intensified" by the visit.
II. A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE: EMPHASIZING THE PURSUIT OF
TRUTH AS A CIVIC AND PERSONAL VIRTUE
One partial response to the problem of widespread self-cen-
sorship, in whatever form, cuts across ideological boundaries.
This consists in cultivating a desire, even an overriding desire in
this context, to seek the truth in matters of politics. The quest
for a closer approach to the truth in policy and politics, precisely
given our inevitable biaseso and fallibility, can be seen as a per-
sonal and civic virtue.
There are admittedly costs to prioritizing the pursuit of
truth as a virtue. One's political commitments may be intense
and important to one's identity and may help secure one's place
in institutions and social organizations. It is possible that more
strongly prioritizing the pursuit of the truth in politics might take
the edge off one's political intensity, or even off of one's active
quest for justice as a political goal. There may be a risk of turn-
ing from a Quixote into a Hamlet.7 1
More positively, though, prioritizing a conscientious search
for truth, even as an unattainable ideal, may allow one to better
balance the qualities of the single-system obsessed "hedgehog"
and the more nuanced, eclectic-minded "fox," to one's general
betterment as a judge of events. 72 One dedicated first to truth
rather than to partisanship or to predetermined answers may
69. For the broader metaphors of "the politics of the centrifuge" and of
the perhaps unduly optimistic formulation of "echo chambers," see BISHOP,
supra note 32, at 228, 227. Orwell famously depicts this phenomenon in its
most extreme form in the famous Two Minutes of Hate ritual. See GEORGE
ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 12-13 (Plume 2003) (1949) (involving more
or less voluntary exposure to a "venomous attack upon the doctrines of the
Party-an attack so exaggerated and perverse that a child should have been
able to see through it, and yet just plausible enough to fill one with an alarmed
feeling that other people, less level-headed than oneself, might be taken in").
70. See generally HEURISTIcs, supra note 57; JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (explaining
that people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles).
71. See IvAN TURGENEv, HAMLET AND DON QUIXOTE (Robert Nichols
trans., 1976) (1860). See also Sherman & Cohen, supra note 58 (noting that
taking seriously political information at odds with one's own views may threaten
one's self-esteem and recommending, on this basis, that persons-or at least
those seeking to persuade them-emphasize alternative sources of self-worth
and self-esteem).
72. See TETLOCK, supra note 47 (finding superior predictive results and
greater self-awareness to be associated with nuanced, multi-dimensional, adap-
tive fox-type theorists, as distinct from single system-bound hedgehog-type
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also be more persuasive to the uncommitted. There are also dig-
nity-related interests in pursuing an assumedly meaningful truth.
Even more deeply, we might ask about the ultimate value of
political commitments not based upon a constraining commit-
ment to the truth, or to some meaningful check upon individual
and group self-delusion." There may in time be a surprising fra-
gility even to dominant, shared political commitments not disci-
plined by a concern for truth in any serious sense.74 If the truth
does not much matter, are one's political commitments,
whatever goals they may otherwise serve, not ultimately arbitrary?
Does one want to admit this ultimate arbitrariness in the course
of one's advocacy and actual politicking?
But if the pursuit of the truth does matter, and one does
not prioritize that pursuit, does that not undermine the ultimate
dignity of one's political life and commitments? Is there much
dignity in political commitments based on what one could, with
reasonable good faith effort, discover to be illusion? Do we have,
on the other hand, any reason to fear that committing first to the
pursuit of the truth will lead us toward genuinely disastrous polit-
ical conclusions?76 Why not adopt a pleasant, if ultimately disas-
trous course, if there is no truth of the matter? Reflecting on
thinkers). For the basic metaphor, see ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE
Fox: AN ESSAY ON TOLSToY's VIEW OF HISTORY (Ivan R. Dee 1993) (1953).
73. For a recent debate on this general subject, see RICHARD RORTY &
PASCAL ENGEL, WHAT'S THE USE OF TRUTH? (Patrick Savidan ed., William
McCuaig trans., 2007). For some relevant moral theory, see, for example, RICH-
ARD JOYCE, THE MYTH OF MORALITY (2001); MARK ELI KALDERON, MORAL FIC-
TIONALISM (2005); WALTER SINNorr-ARMSTRONG, MORAL SKEPrCIsMS (2006).
74. See VAciAv HAVEL, OPEN LETTERS: SELECTED WRITINGS 1965-1990 147
(Paul Wilson ed., 1992).
75. Even an irritated sense that any unbiased person should be able to
somehow "see" the rightness of one's commitments seems to involve a crude
form of intuitionism regarding moral truth. For sophisticated versions of intui-
tionism, see ROBERT AUDI, THE Goon IN THE RIGHT: A THEORY OF INTUITION
AND INTRINSIC VALUE (2005); MICHAEL HUEMER, ETHICAL INTUITIONISM (2005);
ETHICAL INTUITIONISM: RE-EVALUATIONS (Philip Stratton-Lake ed., 2003).
76. Suppose that we discover the (perhaps paradoxical) truth of the mat-
ter to be that "[t]he human race is just a chemical scum on a moderate-sized
planet." PAUL DAVIES, COSMIC JACKPOT: WHY OUR UNIVERSE IsJUST RIGHT FOR
LIFE 222 (2007) (quoting DAVID DEUTSCH, THE FABRIC OF REALITY 177-78
(1997)). If this were so, and our political commitments were dampened as a
result, wherein would lie the great objective loss in facing that reality? If people
genuinely are reducible to a chemical scum, we would never have had any tradi-
tional sort of dignity to lose either way. Our political commitments would be
ultimately arbitrary, gratuitous, and deluded. If some form of skepticism really
turns out to be our best answer, then we never really had especially much to
lose.
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these questions may properly lead us to take the pursuit of truth
more seriously as an intellectual and practical virtue.
We must of course first see an enhanced commitment to
pursuing the truth as at least possible, before we can see it as a
crucial virtue. From the standpoint of sheer possibility, consider
the testimony of the writer and free press advocate Hilaire
Belloc:
There are some (and I count myself one) who will read
anything, however much they may differ from its tone and
standpoint, in order to obtain more knowledge. I am not
sure that it is a healthy habit. At any rate it is an unusual
one. Most men will only read that which, while informing
them, takes for granted a philosophy more or less sympa-
thetic with their own. 7
Nor are occasional free press advocates and particular schol-
ars the only persons for whom the appeal of truth can be impor-
tant. The philosopher Michael Dummett more broadly suggests
that "[o]ur progression, from childhood on, through successive
layers of distinction of the objective from the subjective forms in
us a desire to understand what things are like in themselves, as
opposed to how they appear to us." 7
Those who would prioritize the pursuit of truth over their
commitment to a substantive school of thought are not without
their admirable modern role models. Consider at a minimum
Ludwig Wittgenstein's remark that "[t]hc philosopher is not a
citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes [him or
her] into a philosopher."" This does not commit Wittgenstein
to any robust theory of truth. But Wittgenstein here seems at
least to adopt a certain distancing from one's own policy prefer-
ences and substantive conclusions.
More concretely, and more directly, consider the approach
of Charles Darwin. Darwin, apparently, did not ignore or elbow
77. HiLAIRE BELLoc, THE FREE PRESS 66-67 (Wildside Press 2006) (1918).
78. MICHAEL DummEr, THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF PHILOSoPiHY 43
(Akeel Bilgrami ed., 2010). See also 3 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of
Human Understanding, in COLLECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN 619 (Fred-
erick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran eds., 5th ed. 1992) (referring to a "desire to
know" that is "independent of the individual's likes and dislikes, of his wishful
and his anxious thinking").
79. LUDWIc WITTGENSTEIN, ZEITEL § 455 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von
Wright eds., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1967). See also the London Times obitu-
ary for noted philosopher Sir Peter Strawson: "He had no interest, though, in
gathering disciples; . . . he always wished [his students] to attach them [selves]
not to himself, but to the highest standards of philosophical argument." SirPeter
Strawson, TimEs (London), Feb. 15, 2006, available at http://www.timesonline.
co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article730826.ece.
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aside apparent discrepancies within what was to become known
as Darwinism. In particular, a contemporary theorist indicates
that
Darwin ... kept a special notebook to write down observa-
tions that seemed to falsify his theory. Darwin did this
because he realized he had a tendency to forget these
anomalous observations, . . . presaging psychological
research on cognitive biases such as the tendency of people
to search selectively for evidence that confirms held
hypotheses.80
In this and other respects, pursuit of the truth may require
psychological sacrifices."' But the examples of Wittgenstein,8 2
Darwin," and others8 4 illustrate how this virtue can be cultivated.
Importantly for our purposes, the example of Darwin in particu-
lar shows how genuine openness and receptivity to unwelcome
data can protect against the subtle self-censorship of artificial iso-
lation and self-validation.
III. CONcLusioN
When we otherwise freely choose to, at a minimum, largely
"cocoon" ourselves within a self-confirming political communica-
tion environment, we engage, on the "input" side, in a form of
political self-censorship. The problem of self-censorship in its
contemporary forms should not be minimized. Enhanced com-
munications technology has apparently not upgraded our gen-
eral level of civic and political knowledge from modest previous
baseline levels." The current quality of political discourse across
partisan and ideological lines has understandably been called
80. David M. Buss, Sexual Strategies Theory: Historical Origins and Current
Status, 35J. Sex REs. 19, 19 (1998).
81. It has been argued, at the extreme, that "[t]he seeker after truth
should be humbler than the dust. . . . Only then, and not until then, will he
have a glimpse of truth." M.K. GANDHI, An Autobiography: The Story of My
Experiments With Truth ix-x (Mahadev Desai trans., 1957).
82. See WrrroENSTEIN, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
83. See Buss, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
84. See GANDHI, supra note 81. This would include Gandhi as a seeker
after truth.
85. See, e.g., Daniel F. Stone, Ideological Media Bias, (Aug. 2010) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1376085 (citing
PEw RESEARCH CENTER, WHAT AMERICANs KNow: 1989-2007 (2007), http://
people-press.org/reports/pdf/319.pdf ("[D]espite consumer media options
increasing in recent years, the degree to which the population is informed on
political issues is not improving.")). See also William A. Galston, Civic Education
and Political Participation, 37 PS: Poi.. Sci. & Poi.. 263 (2004). In general, it
seems fair to say that any increase in political vitriol and contempt has not been
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into serious question." Professor Ronald Dworkin has gone so
far as to judge that our overall political discourse is in an "appal-
ling state."" Thus, we must turn to an emphasis on the civic and
personal virtue of the pursuit of truth, prior to or constraining
our substantive political commitments."
We unfortunately cannot be sure that most people will find
the pursuit of political truth, wherever it may lead," more
rewarding than simply retaining their pre-existing political com-
mitments. We occasionally find an odd combination of "true
believership" and a litigator adversarialism on behalf of one's
adopted political "client" and one's own ideas. There can be a
sense that ignorance, strategy, posturing, and disingenuousness
have occasionally replaced candor and genuine inquiry.
Part of the problem here is that in the realm of politics, indi-
viduals who hold what turn out to be false or otherwise unexpect-
edly costly beliefs do not generally, as individuals, absorb or
internalize the costs of their own mistaken beliefs.o Being even
grossly and perpetually personally wrong about broad political
matters normally involves few personal costs that can be attrib-
uted to the personal error itself, as opposed to, say, the popular-
ity or unpopularity of the view.
A person who, in contrast, buys a defective and unwarranted
consumer product, or who mistakenly drinks spoiled milk, or
even, on some accounts, adopts an untrue religion, typically
internalizes and personally bears much of the costs of those per-
sonal mistakes. But a citizen's mistaken opinion about a broad
economic or political issue, even as a voter,9 ' does not cause a
legislature to adopt a policy where it would otherwise not do so.
matched by an increasingly sophisticated public grasp of opposing positions, or
of the relevant underlying social sciences and humanities.
86. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECUlAR Dis-
COURSE 3-6 (2010) (citing RONALD DWORKIN, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?
PRINCIPLES FOR A NEw POLITIcAL DEBATE 22 (2006) ("[M]ost people now have
no interest in discussion or debate with those they regard as belonging to an
entirely alien religious or political culture.")).
87. DWORKIN, supra note 86, at 1.
88. See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
89. This phrase echoes that of Thomas Jefferson: "[W]e are not afraid to
follow truth wherever it may lead . . . ." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wil-
liam Roscoe (Dec. 27, 1820) (on file with the Library of Congress Thomas Jef-
ferson Paper Series I, Image #419).
90. For a useful discussion, see Michael Huemer, Why People Are Irrational
About Politics, http://hone.sprynet.com/-owlI/irrationality.htm (last visited
Jan. 10, 2011).
91. See, e.g., Satoshi Kanazawa, Why Do People Vote? I, PSYCHOL. TODAY. Sc!.
FUNDAMENTALIST (Nov. 8, 2009), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-
scientific-fundamentalist/20091 1/why-do-people-vote-i.
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Such mistaken individual judgments typically impose no detecta-
ble public policy costs at all, let alone public policy costs that any
individual voter must internalize. There is, in this sense, little
incentive on the merits for individuals to try to be right about
public policy.
Of course, there are all sorts of possible social and psycho-
logical costs (and benefits) of speaking in favor of policies in
which one has insufficient reason to believe." Membership in a
valued group may exert pressure toward adopting particular
beliefs. Self-image may also play a role. From the standpoint of
minimizing self-censorship, though, we must hope that reasons
for conscientiously seeking the truth are at least as strong. The
degree of appeal of strengthening one's desire to determine the
truth, based on considering a broader range of views, reflects in
part one's perceived costs in doing so. On the positive side,
though, there does not seem to be any law of nature holding that
we cannot take genuine pleasure, or at least less displeasure, in
encountering an apparent counterexample to even an intensely
held belief."
92. See generally Huemer, supra note 90 (describing differing views for vot-
ers' beliefs).
93. See Buss, supra note 80 and accompanying text. We might see such
experiences as enhancing our knowledge, dignity, temperance, self-realization,
and prudential wisdom. More broadly, note the inevitable collective indispens-
ability over time of the classic virtues. See, e.g.,JoseF PIEPER, THE FOUR CARDINAL
VIRTUES (Richard Winston trans., 1966). Seeing value in these qualities, for
their own sake, might tend to partially allay the fear that reduced "extremism"
by one side of a political dispute simply advantages the other, as yet not moder-
ated, side. Virtue need not be simply a tactical gambit in which one attempts to
sucker one's pre-determined political opponents.
